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Abstract  
 
The value creation process in a company and the competitive position are critically influenced 
by corporate resource allocation and proper valuation of investment alternatives. After the 
Second World War, capital budgeting and strategic planning emerged as two complementary 
but different systems for resource allocation. 
The real options approach developed in the ’80s may provide a useful tool for making a 
connection between capital budgeting and strategic management. Real options are implicit 
managerial and operating flexibilities embedded in many non-financial assets and liabilities. 
In a wider sense: “A real option is the investment in physical assets, human competence, and 
organisational capabilities that provide the opportunity to respond to future contingent events” 
(Kogut-Kulatilaka, 2001). 
 
This paper shows that Just-in-Time (JIT) system as management philosophy can be regarded 
as a knowledge-based or capability-based implicit strategy rather than a simple, easy-to-
imitate best practice approach. Moreover, implementation of JIT can be considered as a 
strategic investment. 
The presentation focuses on how the relation among strategic investments, developed 
technological systems and corporate strategy can be expressed through the real options view. 
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THE IMPORTANCE OF REAL OPTION THEORY 
 
The value creation process in a company and its competitive position are critically influenced 
by corporate resource allocation and proper valuation of investment alternatives. After the 
Second World War, capital budgeting and strategic planning emerged as two complementary 
but different systems for resource allocation. Myers (1987) refers to the two systems as “two 
cultures looking at the same problem”. 
 
Capital budgeting  
Capital budgeting developed into a decentralized process organised around individual or 
stand-alone projects based on DCF techniques. It focused on measurable cash flows and 
sought to make appropriate adjustments for the timing and riskiness of these cash flows 
(Trigeorgis, 1996, xi). 
DCF techniques were originally developed to value passive investments in bonds and stocks. 
Traditional project valuation methods were predicted on the implicit assumption of passive 
management The DCF approach assumes that companies will follow a predetermined plan, 
regardless of how future events unfold. Conventional project evaluation ignores the upside 
potentials to an investment from managerial flexibility and innovations. Active management 
focuses on the strategic flexibility that gives management the option to revise decisions while 
a project is underway.  
 
Strategic management 
Because of these inherent limitations, DCF techniques have not gained as much acceptance in 
strategic planning, where competitive advantage, market leadership and industry structure 
remain dominant concepts.  
The ’60s can be characterised by the classical strategic theory. According to this, strategy is a 
result of a deliberated intellectual activity. Porter's planning idea (Porter, 1985) belongs to 
this group. Firms have to position themselves in the industrial environment, and substance of 
the competitive strategy is to choose and create appropriate position.  
As businesses grew in the ‘70s and ‘80s a greater need for decentralisation of decision 
making and compartmentalisation into separate divisions was seen. Along with the new 
decentralized organisational structures (strategic business units) came decentralised resource 
allocation, often favouring a piecemeal approach.   
Nowadays, “strategy research reflects competing ideas about how the world looks, or what 
the world needs. There is currently debate in strategy research between the importance for a 
firm to “position” itself in the market or to focus on developing unique capabilities. Bowman 
(1995) made the distinction between strategies that look in the mirror and those that look 
through the looking glass. In the parlance of contemporary strategy research, resource and 
knowledge theories of the firm are inward looking; whereas market positioning and industry 
analysis are outward looking” (Kogut – Kulatilaka, 2001). 
The resource based and knowledge theories view the unique capabilities of the firm as the 
cornerstone of sustainable rents. 
 
The real option approach  
Real option theory developed in the ’80s may provide a useful tool for making a connection 
between capital budgeting and strategic management. Through the ‘80s, financial option 
evaluation methods had been applied to evaluate flexibility associated with physical 
investments. This extension has been labelled real option.  
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Real options are implicit managerial and operating flexibilities embedded in many non-
financial assets and liabilities. Busby and Pitts (1997) described real options to their survey 
respondents as simply “flexibility” (in MacDougall – Pike, 2002). 
In a wider sense: “A real option is the investment in physical assets, human competence, and 
organisational capabilities that provide the opportunity to respond to future contingent events” 
(Kogut-Kulatilaka, 2001). 
 
Flexibility has value under uncertainty. The concept of real options acknowledges that 
downside risk is limited while upward potential is maximized if management can alter the 
sequence of strategic actions and investment. Companies, operating in a changing and 
turbulent marketplace must be flexible. The belief is that these companies are agile; and by 
making the right moves today, they open up windows of opportunity for learning and 
profitability. They learn from mistakes, learn faster than competitors, and make quick 
adjustments to seize opportunities by exercising the options presented to them (Yeo – Qiu, 
2003). 
When investment is irreversible and future market conditions are uncertain, an investment 
decision must not be based solely on the usual net present value (NPV) rule. An investment 
expenditure implicitly calls for sacrifice of the option to wait-to-invest (defer), so that we 
must treat this lost option value as part of the investment cost2. 
Similar adjustments are necessary when there are options to abandon or temporarily shut 
down, options depending on the sequential nature of investment and options to choose 
capacity.  
Management’s flexibility to adapt its future actions introduces an asymmetry or skewness in 
the probability distribution of NPV or payoff that expands the investment opportunity’s true 
value by improving its upside potential while limiting downside losses relative to 
management’s initial expectations under passive management (Fig.1.). 
 
Fig.1. 
Traditional Project Evaluation  Project Evaluation with Flexibility 
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In the absence of such managerial flexibility, the probability distribution of NPV would be 
reasonably symmetric, in which case the static (or passive) expected NPV (mean value of 
                                                 
2 McDonald and Siegel (1986) showed that even with moderate amounts of uncertainty, the value of the option 
to wait can be significant, which suggests that an investment rule ignoring the option value can be grossly in 
error (in Real Options in Capital Investment, Chapter 5 ed. by L. Trigeorgis (1995)). 
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symmetric distribution) would coincide with its mode or most likely estimate. With 
managerial flexibility, such as exercising of options and other innovations, it introduces 
enhanced upside potential so that the resulting actual distribution is skewed to the right. The 
true expected value of such an asymmetric distribution exceeds its mode by an option 
premium, reflecting the value of managerial flexibility, with the expected NPV1 being 
enhanced to NPV2. Hence, NPV2 (active) = NPV1 (passive) + c, where c = value of 
managerial flexibility afforded by embedded real options. 
NPV1 is the passive NPV of an investment. Since the value of managerial flexibility is not 
tangible cash flow, it does not enter NPV1’s computation. NPV2 is active NPV. This value 
shows that real options enable management to flexibly change traits of the investment in order 
to add value.  
The mentioned option value can quite possibly turn a negative NPV1 into a positive NPV2.  
Real options are not merely theoretical curiosities. In many cases, they can tip the balance 
between project acceptance and rejection. 
 
THE ROLE OF ACCELERATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Current research emphasises the fact that traditional financial measures, like NPV, do not 
value investment alternatives containing real options correctly. (Yeo-Qiu (2003), Trigeorgis 
(1996), 120.-124.p., Amram – Kulatilaka (1999)). Particularly, the following sources of 
strategic value are difficult to incorporate in the framework of standard capital budgeting:  
- managerial operating flexibility as a collection of operating real options; 
- project synergies; 
- growth opportunities and interrelated dependence among projects (Trigeorgis – 
Kasanen (1991)). 
Asymmetry coming from the managerial capacity for adaption claims an extended or 
strategic investment criteria which represent both value components: 
1. traditional (static or passive) NPV of direct cash flows, 
2. option value of operating flexibility and strategic interactions. 
 
Strategy and manufacturing capabilities 
 
The dynamic and rapidly changing markets and technologies have called into question the 
sustainability of a competitive advantage. Increasingly, companies were looking to advanced 
manufacturing technologies (AMT) to acquire or sustain compatitive advantage. AMT is 
typically more expensive and complex than conventional technology and much of the value 
needed to justify its adoption is derived from benefits that are intangible, contingent and hard 
to quantify. 
 
Dramatic operational improvements were realised, but they have rarely resulted in sustainable 
profitability. Firms introduced more or less well applicable best practice; however, it seemed 
that they were not able to overtake each other. This phenomenon is called as 
‘hypercompetition’ by Porter (1996). 
 
Along the new production dogma a new idea has emerged, i.e. operations’ role is not just 
implementing of strategy; on the contrary, operations can be determinant of corporate strategy 
through developing unique organisational capabilities. It is widely accepted that Penrose 
(1959) was the first who suggested determinant role of manufacturing resources of firms. 
From the 80's several authors have emphasised advantages generated by manufacturing 
knowledge, e.g. Nelson and Winter (1982), Wheelwright and Hayes (1985), Hayes, 
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Wheelwright and Clark (1988), Wheelwright and Clark (1992), Hamel and Prahalad (1990, 
1991, 1994), Hayes and Pisano (1994), Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997), Hayes and Upton 
(1998). 
 
According to Hayes and Pisano (1994) a company should think of itself as a collection of 
evolving capabilities (Hayes and Pisano, 1994)3. The key to long term success is being able to 
do certain things better than rivals can.  Hayes' ideas indicated changes concerning not only 
manufacturing but substance of the competitive strategy. This change integrates 
manufacturing strategy with the notions of both core competences and learning organisations, 
and suggests that competitive advantages can be gained by a strategy using manufacturing 
processes (Wheelwright and Hayes, 1985; Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark, 1988; Hayes and 
Pisano, 1994).  
 
Operations’ role is not just implementing of strategy. 'Superior operations effectiveness not 
only serves to buttress a company's existing competitive position, but when based on 
capabilities, that are embedded in the company's people and operating processes, is 
inherently difficult to imitate'. Consequently, the sustainability of a competitive advantage that 
is based on superior operating skills is enhanced, because it is difficult to duplicate and 
because competitors may not perceive its potential effectiveness, or even its existence (Hayes 
and Upton, 1998). 
 
According to Hayes and Upton (1998) the cause of that the operational effectiveness based on 
organisational capabilities is so valuable is that the source of innovations in operations are 
inherently difficult to imitate and slow diffusion. The reason for it is that the superior 
operating capabilities are organisationally specific, thus competitive advantages provided by 
them are more sustainable. On the other hand, operations-based strategies have a dynamic 
quality. Continuous improvement is the essence of today’s most effective operations 
organisations. The most difficult task is to learn, obtain or develop the ability of improving 
new and valuable capabilities. Organisations that are able to solve it will be able to push out 
the frontiers of their operating performance faster than competitors can; and they are 
possessed of the ability of organisational learning and quick adaptability. 
 
 
STRATEGIC VALUE OF JIT 
 
JIT AS IMPLICIT STRATEGY 
 
JIT system is equivalent to Toyota Production System (TPS). This paper considers JIT in the 
largest sense, i.e., regarded as a philosophy of management concerning all aspects of a firm’s 
productive activities with the main purpose of the elimination of waste.  
 
Sakakibara et al (1997) refers to JIT as an overall organisational phenomenon, and it is 
accordance with the wider sense of JIT. Regarding this paper, the most important conclusions 
of the article are the following: there is a statistically significant relationship between the 
combined set of JIT and infrastructure practices and the set of manufacturing performance 
measures; and there is a strong relationship between manufacturing performance and 
achieving a competitive advantage. The authors did not explain in detail how can be the 
                                                 
3 Compare with the concept of 'routine' in Nelson-Winter (1982). 
  6
combination of JIT and infrastructures practices realised. However, the study of Spear and 
Bowen (1999) shows a possible version of this combination called ‘scientific method’.  
 
According to the authors the activities of the firm can be regarded as the set of controlled 
experiments. Whenever Toyota defines a specification, it is establishing sets of hypotheses 
that can be tested. This approach is not imposed on workers, it is ingrained in them. The 
article says that the key is to understand that the TPS creates a community of scientists.  
The tacit knowledge that underlies the Toyota Production System can be captured in four 
basic rules. These rules guide the design, operation, improvement of every activity, 
connection, and pathway for every product and service. Problem-solving and learning take 
place at all levels of the company. 
 
Connections, relations, and production flows are coordinated by collective knowledge of the 
organisation through scientific method. This knowledge is embedded in the organisation, 
distributed and tacit4 It can be considered as an outstanding organisation-based operating 
capability following Hayes and Upton (1998). According to Lam (1998) there is a close 
connection between the dominant knowledge type and structural configuration of 
organisation. Toyota's knowledge is embedded which is generated by JIT. The organisational 
structure adequate for embedded knowledge is J-form organisation, i. e., Japanese type of 
organisation The tacit (implicit) knowledge is inherent in routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982), 
and it is accumulated by ‘learning by doing’ J-form organisation, consequently Toyota is a 
‘knowledge creating company’ (Hayes-Clark-Wheelwright (1988), Nonaka-Takeuchi (1995) 
in Lam (1998)). The scientific method provides consideration and continuous improvement of 
all aspects of the firm. Through the continuous improvement, it makes the ability of 
developing new capabilities possible; hence, the company becomes to be able to shift 
productivity frontiers faster than its rivals do. 
 
Consequently, JIT can be considered a knowledge-based implicit strategy following 
Mintzberg’s idea, because it is difficult to understand and imitate. Difficulty of imitation also 
results from a strong fit of activities. Managing this fit enhances both competitive advantage 
and sustainability. Using scientific method, however, the organisation of Toyota is learning 
continuously; hence, this fit becomes a unique organisational capability (Rózsa, 2002). 
 
EMBEDDED OPTIONS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF JIT5 
 
Most Japanese firms do not rely on the seemingly more scientific DCF techniques6, although 
they do perceive some significant value in managing real options over time.  
 
According to the previous section, implementation of JIT system is a strategic investment in 
infrastructure. Infrastructure investments consist of both tangible and intangible assets on 
which individual operating flexibility are based. Flexible manufacturing systems such as JIT 
                                                 
4 Tacit knowledge refers to knowledge that is intuitive, unarticulated, and that cannot be easily codified and 
transferred. It is based on experience and bodily action, it can only be acquired through ’learning-by-doing’ 
Collective knowledge refers to the ways in which knowledge is distributed and shared among members of the 
organisation. It is the accumulated knowledge of the organisation stored in its rules, procedures, routines and 
shared norms, which guide the behaviour, problem-solving activities and pattern of interaction among its 
members. A combination of individual implicit knowledge and collective knowledge may create embedded 
knowledge. Embedded knowledge is relation-specific, contextual, path dependent and dispersed (Lam, 1998). 
5 Trigeorgis (1995), Real options in Japan by Takato Hiraki, 151-163 p. 
6 Japanese firms typically use very restrictive payback standards for incremental investments. For example, a 
three year payback for product model changes is not unusual for durable consumer goods. 
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are evidential. In addition to accumulated technology through R&D, some aspects of Japanese 
management provide the intangible infrastructure required for certain real options. For 
example, the Japanese labor force is well trained and specialises in more than one area of 
operation. In Japan, there usually exist regular (lifetime) employees and part-time workers. 
Regular employees are generally treated better, but they are subject to bonus cuts and are 
expected to be cooperative in various cost-cutting programs implemented during less 
profitable periods. These systems unique to Japanese companies such as Toyota, also provide 
the infrastructure in order to more effectively build and manage real options. 
 
Japanese manufacturing firms have aggressively invested in flexible manufacturing systems 
(Jaikumar, 1989). The resulting operating flexibility is well treated within a real options 
framework. 
Many operating flexibilities derive from infrastructure investments in a core asset, system, or 
information and manufacturing technology. Such an infrastructure investment is valuable 
since it increases contingency opportunities and the value of real options. Those firms 
equipped with such basic infrastructure are better able to increase potential gains or reduce 
losses through appropriate timely operational adjustments. The contingent plans of such firms 
typically include various standard operating flexibility options. 
These are the following: 
 
1. Options to switch  
 
  Output switch 
 
It refers to product line producing one or several kinds of product. As the demand for a 
product changes adversely, a new product is quickly introduced with manufacturing 
flexibility. The Japanese manufacturers in automobile and high-technology industries have 
focused on this flexibility due to sophisticated domestic consumers and high quality 
standards. This flexibility has, in turn, helped them become more competitive in foreign 
markets. 
 
   
          Input switch 
 
Input switch means that production facility allows the use of alternative process or technology 
depending on the price of inputs. To produce the same product, process flexibility can 
contribute to maintaining low production costs and profitability when the cost of alternative 
product inputs fluctuates. A major production facility is designed and maintained so as to 
quickly adjust to these changes through the use of different technologies depending on the 
relative cost of the inputs. 
 
 
2. Options to alter  
 
This flexibility makes it possible for a manufacturer to expand or contract the scale of 
operations by changing the utilization of production facilities or resources. Since Japanese 
manufacturers are more vertically integrated or related to suppliers and customers, this 
production scale adjustment for them is easier than for their competitors; in the U.S., for 
example. The scale expansion is supported by industrial group companies and financial 
institutions while the downward adjustment sometimes involves industry-wide coordination. 
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3. Option to defer 
 
A project with negative NPV may become profitable if it can be deferred over a certain time 
period. For example, output prices can increase or borrowing rates decrease unexpectedly. 
This flexibility is more beneficial to Japanese manufacturers because of their stable and 
reciprocal relations with contractors and financial institutions than to their U. S. competitors.  
JIT system can be characterized by presented real options concerning production/operating 
flexibility. 
 
Strategic versus operating options 
 
Regarding strategic technology or infrastructure investments firms usually invest in two types 
of real options (Yeo-Qiu, 2003): strategic (or growth) options and operating (flexibility) 
options.  
 
As discussed earlier, operational flexibility options are common in technology investments 
that yield direct measurable payoffs. However, these operational options must be planned7 
and designed to fit each investment differently. The flexibility strategy allows a firm to more 
easily and quickly switch product features or service offerings to meet changing market 
conditions. In the literature investment in flexible manufacturing systems are classic 
examples. JIT system is more than a collection of flexibility options. 
 
Strategic options are usually spawned by investments that aim at developing core 
technologies and/or building experience with promising technologies that could become the 
drivers of future organisational capabilities. 
 
Following Kyläheiko, et. al.  (2002) we can complete previous real option system with 
 
4. Implementation option 
 
Implementation options represent the decision on how the company configures its value chain 
by choosing among alternative resources, routines and capabilities. The choices the firm can 
make about how it will organise its value chain can greatly affect both the speed with which 
the value chain can be assembled and the flexibility of the chain to change tasks once it is in 
place. The choice set consisting of routines and capabilities is of course highly dependent on 
former cumulative decisions and learning processes realised throughout the company.  
 
Moreover, according to  Yeo – Qiu (2003) we can examine 
 
5. Learning option 
 
Investing in operating options can be used to create a window for education and learning, and 
lead to enhanced organisational capabilities and consequential reduction of risk. R&D 
investments for exploring and learning about different technologies is an example. Sub-
options may be created due to learning and for becoming more knowledgeable. 
 
                                                 
7 Options to switch and options to alter are the typical examples. 
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Implementation of JIT system includes complex/compound options since it contains naturally 
emerging options and designed-in options as well; but also strategic options like 
implementation and learning options are embedded in JIT. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Real options create a relationship between capital budgeting and strategic management.  
Real options thinking compels managers to go beyond a single point estimate of the likely 
future but to recognise a broader domain of possible opportunities. Many investment 
scenarios can be considered as sets of options. An options approach to capital budgeting has 
the potential to conceptualise and quantify the value of options from active management and 
strategic interactions. This value is typically manifest as a collection of “real options” 
embedded in capital-investment opportunities.  
 
By systematically developing these options, companies achieve continuous improvement in 
operating flexibility and strategic adaptability, thus gaining a substantial competitive 
advantage over their rivals.  
 
This article dealt with strategic aspects of JIT in terms of real options. It can be stated that JIT 
is more than a simple production management system. Following Mintzberg’s idea, it can be 
considered a knowledge-based implicit strategy because it is difficult to understand and 
imitate.  Consequently, JIT is more than a simple collection of flexibility options because of 
its strong strategic relevance. If a company during the implementation of flexible 
manufacturing system considers only the technological side, it can lose value-creating aspects. 
Adaption of JIT results in flexible production system. And in addition to this, it allows 
dvelopment of difficult-to-imitate strategic capabilities as well, and thus contributes to 
achieving and sustaining a competitive advantage.  
 
This study examined qualitatively the benefits of adaption of JIT system. Concrete 
applications and quantitative tests can induce further research in this area.  
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